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


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basic imagery interpretation report

Soviet Eastern Theater Headquarters and C3 Assets (S)



DEPLOYED COMMO/ELEC/RADAR FACILITIES

BE: Various

USSR

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INSTALLATION OR ACTIVITY NAME					COUNTRY
Soviet Eastern Theater Headquarters and C3 Assets					USSR
UTM COORDINATES	GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES	CATEGORY	BE NO.	COMIREX NO.	NIETB NO.
NA	See Below	See Below	See Below	See Below	See Below
MAP REFERENCE					
DMA, USATC, Series 200, Various Sheets, scale 1:200,000					
LATEST IMAGERY USED			NEGATION DATE (if required)		
Oct 1984			NA		

Installation Name	Geographic Coordinates	Category	BE No	COMIREX No	NIETB (MRN No)
Ulan-Ude HCF Hq Complex	51-50-50N 107-53-40E				
Ulan-Ude Army Bks AL3/Hq Sig Bde	51-51-09N 107-53-32E				
Ulan-Ude Army Bks AL8/Hq Sig Reg	51-47-59N 107-39-20E				
Yablonovo Radrel Station	51-52-45N 112-42-50E				
Ulan-Ude Jt Cmd Rec Fac/ Bnk/Hd	51-43-17N 107-48-36E				
Ulan-Ude Jt Cmd Xmtr/ Bnk/Hd	51-56-40N 108-20-35E				
Ulan-Ude East Afld	51-50-55N 107-43-48E				

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ABSTRACT

1. In 1978, the Soviet Union activated a high command of forces (HCF) for the Eastern Theater with a headquarters at Ulan-Ude High Command of Forces Headquarters Complex [] in the Transbaikal Military District (MD). To support this new command, the Soviets undertook an extensive capital investment program for the construction and modification of a headquarters complex and remote facilities. At the same time, they introduced a Trainborne Command Post (TBCP), an Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), an air transport unit, and several ground mobile command, control, and communications (C3) assets to the theater inventory.¹ This report discusses the present area of responsibility and command/headquarters history, provides a facilities/installation description, and describes the redundant C3 assets available to the command. Two maps, 15 annotated photographs, and four tables are included in this report. (S/WN)

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KEY JUDGMENTS

2. Several key analytical judgments on Soviet C3 developments in the Eastern Theater can be made on the basis of a study of the HCF headquarters using imagery acquired between 1978 and 1984. They are:

- Capital investments, as evidenced by extensive construction and new equipment, indicate the Soviets have extensively upgraded their command structure in the Far East, and this command receives a high priority.
- The command upgrading and its high priority status may demonstrate to the People's Republic of China (PRC) the concern and seriousness the Soviets place on a lack of firm long-term relations with the PRC.
- This command headquarters will be an excellent gauge of indications and warning (I&W) for military/political actions in the Far East.
- The redundant structure of fixed and mobile C3 equipment and facilities will insure sustained operations and survivability. (S/WN)

DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND

3. The high command of forces of troops in the Far East controls those forces deployed in the continental theater(s) of military operations (TVDs) in the eastern Soviet Union and coordinates the actions of the forces deployed in maritime theaters. The Far East forces high command's military-geographic area certainly includes the Far East MD, the Transbaikal MD (including Mongolia), Siberian MD forces, and likely includes responsibilities for forces in the Central Asian MD, as well as naval forces in the Sea of Japan, Kamchatka Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean (Figure 1). The HCF exercises command and control of those forces assigned to it by the Supreme High Command (VGK). Traditional high command responsibilities in the past have involved the coordination of groups of fronts, independent armies, and other forces of the armed services in strategic operations.² Historically, such a high command included a general staff operations group and an operations group from the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense. The latter group held responsibility for the coordination of logistics and technical support activities. The commander in chief of such a high command also served as the representative of the VGK and was provided with the appropriate communications means to control a number of fronts and armies and to effect coordination with the other services in the operation(s) or campaign.² (S/WN)

4. In August 1945, a high command of forces in the Far East was created for the strategic command and control of the Manchurian Campaign. In 1947, Marshall R. Y. Malinovskiy was appointed Commander in Chief of the troops in the Far East, and the high command continued to function until approximately 1953. The headquarters was collocated with the former Transbaikal-Amur Military District headquarters at Chita (the main axis of Chita-Dauriya was the principal grouping of Soviet forces deployed in the Far East as the axis was based on the 6th Guards Mechanized Army). The high command controlled the Far East Military District, Maritime Military District (now part of Far East MD), the Pacific Fleet, and the Amur Flotilla.² (U)

5. The decision to activate this HCF headquarters as a separate command element was probably made in early 1978 when the late General Secretary Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov toured the Far East Military District.³ In March 1979, the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported a major command reorganization announcement in the Soviet Far East which included the appointment of a senior military commander.³ The commander named was Vasilii I. Petrov, who was first Deputy to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Ground Forces at the time of his appointment.⁴ This marked one of the few times a theater had been formally activated during peacetime. (S/WN)

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**FIGURE 1. EASTERN SOVIET UNION**

6. Upon his arrival at his new command, General Petrov was immediately elected a member of the Supreme Soviet from the Irkutsk District. Reassigned with General Petrov were Colonel General G. Salmonov as commander of the Transbaikal MD and Colonel General B. Snetkov as commander of the Siberian MD.⁴ These concurrent reassignments displayed the high level of interest placed in the formation of the new command and provided an indication of the newly established subordination. (S/WN)

7. The decision to locate the headquarters at Ulan-Ude instead of Chita appears to have been based on strategic military considerations. The geographic location of Ulan-Ude is ideal in that it is centrally located north of Mongolia approximately 400-700 nautical miles (nm) from the Chinese border, yet it is far enough south not to be impeded by the severe winter weather and permafrost typical of the northern areas of the theater. Within a 300-nm radius of Ulan-Ude are three armies, an air army, an artillery division, an SS-20 division, numerous V GK communications assets, as well as several rear services units. This position gives the commander the advantage of being centrally located and enables him greater flexibility in directing his assets to the axis of advance for strategic directions to the south. In the early 1980s, following the command activation, there was a concentrated upgrade of units and equipment along the entire Sino-Soviet Border. (S/WN)

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BASIC DESCRIPTION**HCF Headquarters Complex**


8. With the selection of Ulan-Ude as the headquarters, various communications and defense assets were modified or built to support the HCF. Within a 15-nm radius of the headquarters are two major airfields (one of which houses an ABNCP), an army headquarters, a signal regiment headquarters, two joint command communications stations (one with a command bunker), and six SAM sites as well as reserves of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) signal brigade that is collocated with the HCF headquarters (Figure 2). (S/WN)

9. Construction for the new headquarters was first observed in August 1979 when an early

warning radar unit and a SCUD brigade housed in the northwest sector of Ulan-Ude RVGK Signal Brigade [] relocated probably to Ulan-Ude Army Barracks AL-8/Headquarters Signal Regiment [] Extensive construction then began in this sector and the surrounding area, and continued through August 1982 when the headquarters complex was completed (Figure 3). The headquarters complex consists of five functional areas: the HCF administration area, the TBCP staging facility, an Independent Security and Services (ISS) Regiment barracks, a high frequency radio communications station, and a helipad (Figure 4). Most of the buildings have been constructed since 1978. (S/WN)

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**FIGURE 2. MAJOR MILITARY ASSETS NEAR ULAN-UDE**

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HCF Administration Area

10. The HCF Administration Area (Figure 5) houses the main headquarters building for the complex. This area also consists of a dependents housing area, a senior officers housing area, and a heliport adjacent to the HCF headquarters building. There is a tall lattice tower which is connected to the headquarters building at the second floor level. The location and height of the tower indicate it is a communications tower vice a security tower, however, no antennas or dishes have been observed to date. (S/WN)

Independent Security and Services Regiment

11. An ISS regiment was established at the HCF headquarters in early 1980 (Figure 6) and is used to establish the Field Communications Post and to provide security for the HCF when it is deployed. The regiment can be subdivided into four units. These units are a headquarters unit, a services unit, a transportation unit, and a guard unit. Equipment indigenous to the regiment includes at least 20 T-62 tanks for the security unit, at least 40 field operations vans, at least 12 expandable Babochka vans used to provide office space for the headquarters unit, and four buses and numerous sedans for the transport unit. The vehicles are normally maintained in vehicle storage sheds and are seen only prior to or following deployments. (S/WN)

High-Frequency Radio Communications Site

12. The high-frequency radio communications (radcom) site consists of one separately fenced area with five Fishbone 2-2-2 antennas and three quadrant antennas (Figure 7). The control building for this site is adjacent to the ISS regiment. Fourteen Kross-131 vehicles are assigned there to assist in establishing field communications sites for deployed locations. This site would provide the radio receiving capability for the HCF headquarters, and the Ulan-Ude Joint Command Transmitter Facility/Bunker/Hard [redacted] probably would provide the transmission capability. The quadrant antennas are omnidirectional with a maximum range limitation of 400-500 nautical miles, and the Fishbone 2-2-2 antennas are

directional with mensurated orientations enabling communications with Moscow (General Staff); Novosibirsk (Headquarters, Siberian MD); Chita (Headquarters, Transbaikalian MD); Khabarovsk (Headquarters, Far East MD); Irkutsk (Headquarters, Air Army); and adjacent TVD-associated command facilities at Sary-Ozek and Komsomolsk. (S/WN)

Helipad

13. The helicopter landing pad, approximately 300 meters north of the headquarters building, consists of a large landing pad with a cross-shaped concrete area and four separate parking aprons (Figure 8). This area is outside the perimeter of the installation, and no security is discernible. (S/WN)

Trainborne Command Post**Deployment History**

14. The Trainborne Command Post (TBCP) was first observed at the HCF on [redacted] and consisted of 18 railcars (Figure 9). The train remained stationary from its arrival until [redacted] with only an occasional switching of railcars, possibly attributable to the maintenance or installation of equipment. The train made its initial deployment between [redacted] and the number of railcars at the staging area decreased to nine (Figure 9). The deployment location of the TBCP is unknown. It could have been deployed in support of one of several large-scale, imagery-confirmed exercises which were conducted during the train's absence. The second deployment of the TBCP was identified on imagery of [redacted] when nine railcars were again deployed. Several imagery-confirmed, large-scale exercises were conducted during this deployment, and two PARK DRIVE satellite communications systems were set up adjacent to the HCF during late June. A 19th railcar, a small fuel car, was periodically observed parked at the head of the train until September 1983 when an engine was added. The fuel car returned to the head of the train in January 1984, one month after the train returned from its deployment, and has become a permanent addition to the train. (S/WN)

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15. A third deployment of the TBCP, the first to include all 18 rail cars, occurred from [redacted] [redacted] During this time frame, there was a large, general staff-directed exercise adjacent to the HCF headquarters involving the extensive deployment of two PARK DRIVE satellite communications systems, a communications center, a staff operations center, and numerous computer/electronics vans. After the completion of this exercise and the return to the garrison of the TBCP, a WOOD BINE satellite communications system was observed on a flatbed railcar which was connected to the TBCP. This WOOD BINE was not in the operational mode, however, it indicates the TBCP may use a mobile independent satellite communications system which can be remote-controlled from the train. (S/WN)

Description

16. The railcars at the TBCP are modified passenger coaches. External modifications to the coach roofs include the following: raised rectangular sections on two cars, numerous raised circular sections on one car, long cables extending the length of one car, large hook-shaped cables on at

least three cars, probable antenna rods on two cars, and a possible long hand-rail type antenna on one car. In addition, five of the cars appear to be sleep/work cars, one appears to be a dining car, and one appears to be a security car. (S/WN)

Staging Facility

17. The TBCP staging facility, the first such facility identified on imagery, is secured separately from the rest of the installation and consists of a train staging area, a headquarters/administration area, a rail-to-road transfer area, a staging control/support area, a warehouse/storage area, and a utilities support area (Figure 10). This area is transited by six rail spurs and includes a revetment with a rail spur that houses the TBCP. (S/WN)

18. The train staging area consists of a revetment 393 meters long by 24 meters wide with an average depth of [redacted] (Figure 11). A guard tower is positioned at the entry to the revetment, and the area is fence secured. The revetment is located in a heavily wooded area and is well lighted. A solid fence is being constructed around the revetment as an additional security measure to screen ground-level observation. (S/WN)

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19. The headquarters/administration area is a small, separately fenced area which possibly houses a train depot guard company. The area consists of a headquarters building, a security building, a messhall, several barracks, and a drill/parade field. (S/WN)

20. The rail on/off loading area is transited by two rail lines which intersect at a switching point to form a single rail line to the rail on/off loading area. This area is probably used for supply deliveries to the complex. The loading position is covered by an L-shaped overhanging shed. There is a separately secured quonset hut in the area with lightning arresters on the corners and is probably used for the storage of sensitive material. A large building is in the early stages of construc-

tion and will probably serve a maintenance function when completed. (S/WN)

21. The control/support area is in the woods south of the TBCP revetment. It consists of eight small equipment/support bunkers and four support buildings. This entire area was constructed in the early 1980s. The largest bunker in the area has a drive-in capability and the entrance is adjacent to the TBCP rail spur. The bunkers in this area are probably for storage. (S/WN)

22. The warehouse/storage area is transited by two rail lines and consists of two large transshipment buildings, six warehouses, three single-depth vehicle storage sheds with space for approximately 24 vehicles, and two greenhouses. (S/WN)

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23. The utilities/support area is transited by five separate rail lines, two of which terminate within this area and are used for transporting raw materials to the heating plant. The area consists of one coal-fired heating plant, one water treatment plant with two storage tanks, four vertical fuel tanks, and one coal unloading point. This area has the capability of supplying power to the entire staging facility should the need arise. (S/WN)

Possible Deployment Location

24. The rail line from the TBCP staging facility connects with the Trans-Siberian rail line

approximately 2 nm north of the HCF complex. A search of available imagery of the Trans-Siberian rail line from Chita to Ulan-Ude was conducted in an attempt to locate unusual rail sidings. Approximately 225 nm east of Ulan-Ude and 25 nm west of Chita, in the vicinity of 51-50-50N/112-43-45E, are two rail spurs approximately one mile apart. These rail spurs exit the main rail line and curve for approximately 300 meters to the side of a hill (Figure 12). One of the rail spurs is in a revetment in a heavily wooded area. Construction of this revetment appears to have been accomplished in 1978–1979. The second spur traverses the other side of the hill and ends abruptly with a steep

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dropoff. These spurs could be possible deployment sites for the TBCP, allowing it to take full advantage of natural concealment. These were the only unusual rail sidings found. In addition, Yablovo Radrel Station [] was constructed in the summer of 1980 on a hill 2.2 nm north of the spurs. The microwave relay tower at this site could be used as a communications relay link from the TBCP to other communications networks within the TVD. (S/WN)

Possible Ancillary Communications Sites

25. A possible communications link for the TBCP is located near the town of Shilka (51-52-00N/116-02-00E) approximately 400 nm east of

Ulan-Ude. There are two sites, one on each side of the town (Figure 13). Although it is presently unknown if these sites serve a military or civilian function, their potential military use cannot be discounted. Each site is fenced and consists of a rail spur with two permanent passenger-type rail coaches and two single rhombic antennas (Figure 14). The antennas at each site form a frequency-diverse pair that are oriented east/west and are used for reception of long-range, high-frequency communications. No control buildings are on either site; and the antennas are cable-connected to the rail cars, indicating the cars are used as the control facilities. The TBCP possibly could use these areas for initial deployment and await further orders. (S/WN)

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Hardened C3 Facilities

26. Located within the Ulan-Ude area are the Ulan-Ude Joint Command Receiver Facility BNK/HQ () and its associated transmitter facility (Figures 15 and 16). These two facilities combine to form a bunkered command center for the direction of military operations within the TVD. The HCF commander can use the receiver facility as an option for deploying his command staff in the advent of hostilities. The transmitter facility is located approximately 25 nm from the receiver facility reducing the vulnerability of the command bunker to hostile action. The receiver facility is cable-connected to the transmitter facility. Judging from the types and mensurated orientations of the antennas at the two sites, communications can be established with Moscow (General Staff); Novosibirsk (Headquarters, Siberian MD); Chita (Headquarters, Transbaikal MD); Khabarovsk (Headquarters, Far East MD); Irkutsk (Headquarters, Air Army); adjacent TVD-associated command facilities at Sary-Ozek and Komsomolsk; plus Bulgar and Ulaan Baatar in Mongolia. (S/WN)

Receiver Facility

27. The receiver facility is located 8.5 nm southeast of Ulan-Ude and consists of an operations area, a support area, and a construction support area. The main operations area has one control bunker, three frequency-diverse pairs of type B hardened antennas, four hardened washer antennas, two concrete housings for retractable antennas, two multistory buildings with masts on the roofs, and numerous support buildings (Figure 15). This bunker is probably used as the underground command post and is one deployment option for the HCF commander. (S/WN)

Transmitter Facility

28. The transmitter facility consists of an operations area and a support area. The operations area has a single fence securing it with a double fence surrounding the control bunker. Within the operations area are two frequency-diverse pairs of type B hardened antennas, underground concrete housing for a retractable radio relay (radrel) antenna, 14 double rhombic antennas, 16 horizontal dipole antennas, four quadrant antennas, a control bunker, and several support buildings (Figure 16). A second site is being constructed immediately southeast of the transmitter site. As of () antennas at this site included two type D hardened antennas and one frequency-diverse pair of type B hardened antennas. (S/WN)

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Airborne Command Post

29. The airborne command post (ABNCP) housed at Ulan-Ude East Airfield () is part of an airborne command unit. These aircraft arrived at this airfield in early 1980 after extensive construction was completed for separate parking aprons and support facilities. The unit consists of 21 aircraft and includes one IL-22 COOT B used as an ABNCP (), one IL-18 COOT, one CARELESS (), two TU-134 CRUSTYs, () two AN-24 COKEs, eight Mi-8 HIP helicopters, four AN-12 CUBs, and two AN-26 CURLs. (Figure 17). The presence of the TU-134 CRUSTY, a known VIP transport aircraft, and the other type aircraft assigned to this unit suggests its mission is probably VIP transport, personnel transport, and cargo transport. This unit was placed under the operational control of the HCF commander and represents another option for deployment of command staff personnel to continue C3 actions in the event of hostilities. (S/WN)

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CONCLUSIONS

30. The Soviet Union has placed high-level interest in the activation of a new command element in the Far East Theater. This command will be capable of controlling all military activity east of the Ural Mountains. To accomplish this mission, resources have been expended to construct and upgrade C3 facilities and equipment throughout the theater. The high command headquarters and associated facilities at Ulan-Ude will provide an excellent military/political I&W capability by enabling the monitoring of high-level general staff communications assets assigned directly to the theater commander. Indications of impending Soviet actions may increase through regular observation because Soviet practice has been to deploy and establish high-level communications units 10-14 days prior to exercises, which are assumed to be a realistic simulation of expected actual practices. (S/WN)

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All applicable imagery acquired between October 1977 and October 1984 was used in the preparation of this report. (S/WN)

MAPS OR CHARTS

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